THE NEW JERSEY PRACTICE ACT OF 1912 by KEASBEY, EDWARD Q.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
THE NEW JERSEY PRACTICE ACT OF 1912*
By Edward Q. Keasbey.
When the reform of legal procedure was taken up in New Yorkin the fifties and common law pleading was supplemented by the
code, New Jersey also made reforms, but they consisted in the
simplification of the procedure at common law. Special demur-
rers for defect of form were abolished, amendments of pleadings
were to be freely allowed, and the necessity for special pleadings
was done away with by provisions that in all actions in which thedefendant pleads the general issue and gives notice of special
matter to be given in evidence, the plaintiff might give notice of
special matter in denial or defense. In actions on promissory
notes and bills of exchange, it was permitted to join makers and
endorsers in an action on the common counts with a copy of the
note or bill and of the endorsements, and in actions of ejectment
all the old fictions were done away with and a schedule of brief
form of pleading was provided. No attempt was made to do
away with the old forms of action; the principles 
-of pleading at
common law remained unaffected, except that special matters
might be set up in defense or reply in informal statements rather
than in special pleas and replication. The act of 1855 was sup-plemented by rules of court and modified by subsequent statutes,
but the statutes and the rules were few. No elaborate code ofpractice was adopted and both practice and pleading became mat-
ters of tradition rather than positive law, and were incidental
rather than matters of substance. There was little controversy
over questions of pleading or practice and there are but few re-
ported cases in recent years on these subjects.
The provision for the informal statements of matters of de-fense and reply did away with the necessity for special pleading
and the latitude allowed in the use of the common counts was not
restricted by any rules like the English rules adopted at the
Hilary term, 1852. The result was that while the forms of com-
mon law pleading were retained and the practice was governed by
common law rules, there was little need for special pleading and
* An article entitled "Should the Demurrer be Abolished in Connecti-
cut" will follow in the February issue.-Ed.
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most cases were brought to issue upon a declaration on the com-
mon counts and a plea of the general issue with bills of particulars
and informal notices of the defense. The issues of fact were not
clearly defined, and the real merit of common law pleading which
consists in stating in advance the precise cause of action and
the exact legal defense and the production of a definite issue was
no longer realized. It came to be true, as Lord Justice Cotton
said of the English practice, "Under the old system of pleading
at common law the purpose was to conceal as much as possible
what was going to be proved at the trial." The Lord Justice
added, "but under the present system, it is our duty to see that
the party so states his case that his opponent will not be taken by
surprise."'
It was substantially this new English system that was adopted
in the rules prescribed by the New Jersey Practice Act of 1912.
These rules do away with the division of causes of action into
actions of contract and in tort. The pleadings consist of a com-
plaint and an answer and it may be a reply. A case is at issue
when the material facts on one side are denied on the other. All
pleadings must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts
on which the pleader relies (and no others) but not the evidence
by which they are to be proved. The statement must be divided
into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each. containing, as
nearly as may be, a separate allegation. Dates, sums and num-
bers must be in figures.
Objections to the complaint must be made by motion and these
may be in the nature of a plea in abatement or a demurrer, but
a demurrer may be made also in the answer. Demurrers as
such and all pleas to the jurisdiction or in abatement are abol-
ished. Objections to the answer also are made upon motion.
Commissioners are to be appointed before whom certain inter-
locutory motions are made.
The new Practice Act itself makes no reference to the forms
of pleading. These are treated in the rules of court provision-
ally adopted in the Act and these rules govern many other mat-
ters of a good deal of importance. It was thought best to have
the details of practice provided for in rules which are expressly
declared to be subject to the control of the court rather than to
have them in the form of statutes, which must be rigidly obeyed.,
One of the important purposes of the Act is to extend the power
l Speddhng v. Fitzpatrick, 38 C. D., 411.
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of the court with respect to the parties to actions at common
law and to the* causes of action that may be joined in a single
suit. It changes an action at common law from a contest be-
tween the two parties with the court as umpire, to a means of
determining the rights of all the persons that are interested in
a controversy arising out of a given transaction. The Act pro-
vides that all parties claiming an interest in the subject of the
action, and in obtaining the judgment demanded, either jointly,
severally or in the alternative, may join as plaintiffs and that per-
sons interested in separate causes of action may join if the causes
of action have a common ground of law or fact and arose out of
the same transaction or series of transactions; and so also any
persons may be made defendant who either jointly, severally or
in the alternative are alleged to have a claim or interest in 'the
controversy, or whom it is necessary to make a party f6r the
complete determination or satisfaction of any question involved
therein. No action may be defeated by the non-joinder or mis-join-
der of parties, and new parties may be added, and parties mis-joined
may be dropped by order of the court at any stage of the cause, as
the ends of justice may require. The plaintiff may join any causes
of action and the defendant may counterclaim and set off any
cause of action and issue a summons to other parties, and judg-
ment may be given for or against one or more of several plain-
tiffs or several defendants and the court may determine the ulti'
mate rights of the parties on each side as between themselves and
grant the defendant any affirmative relief to which he may be
entitled.
The other important subject of the Act is the practice on appeaE
Bills of exceptions and writs of error in all cases are abolished
and an appeal may be taken in any case in which the plaintiff has
heretofore been entitled to a writ of error, and the appeal is in
the nature of a re-hearing upon any question of law involVed in
any ruling, order or judgment below. This does not, however,
do away with the necessity of making objections at the trial to the
admission of evidence or the ruling of the judge. No judgment
may be reversed or a new trial granted on the ground of mis-
direction or the improper admission or exclusion of evidence, or
for error as to. matters of pleading or procedure unless after
examination of thd whole case it shall appear that the error injur.
iously affects the'substantial rights of the parties. One rule pro-
vides that in case bf a new trial there shall be a new trial ofily of
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-the question with respect to which the verdict is found to be
wrong, if separable, and if a new trial is ordered because the
damages are excessive or inadequate, and for no other reason,
the verdict shall be set aside only with respect to damages and
shall stand good in all other respects. Where there is a lack of
proof of some matter capable of being proved by incontrovertible
evidence, the Court of Appeals may allow it to be supplied.
Having made these general provisions with regard to the char-
.acter of an action at common law and with regard to the practice
upon appeal, the statute provides that the Supreme Court should
provide rules for all the common law courts to give effect to the
provisions of the statute and otherwise to simplify judicial pro-
cedure, and that these rules shall supersede, so far as they conflict
with them, the statutory and common law regulations heretofore
existing, and the Act itself provides a set of rules which are to be
deemed to be the rules of court, subject to suspension and amend-
nient in any particular by the court, as experience shall prove to be
expedient.
These rules regulate the joinder of parties, prescribe the order
of pleadings and the forms of the several pleadings, and regulate
briefly the time of filing papers and the course of practice. They
make provision for striking out answers and giving summary
.judgment in certain cases. They provide for preliminary refer-
ences to commissioners for discovery of documents before trial;
and with regard to the trial, there is provision that the jury may
,answer written questions embracing disputed facts in issue and
the amount of damages, and find a general verdict subject to
the opinion of the court on the answers to these questions. Sam-
ple forms of complainant's answer, counterclaim, etc., are given
in the rules.
The effect of the plan embodied in the statute and the rules
will be to give the courts of common law much more latitude than
heretofore in dealing with cases brought before them. The
courts of law and equity are necessarily distinct courts under the
constitution, but this statute gives to the courts of law some
powers formerly characteristic of equity tribunals. One is the
power to make a decree which will be something more than a
money judgment, and another is the power to deal with all per-
sons interested in the subject matter of a controversy and to estab-
lish their rights as between themselves.
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The change in the forms of pleading makes the pleading at
common law substantially similar to those already in use in the
Court of Chancery. Common law pleadings had the advantage
of being based upon established rules of law as to what consti-
tuted a cause of action, and what the legal defenses were. It was
indeed by means of them that the rules of law were established.
They have served their purpose and the modern lawyer is impa-
tient with the logic by which the result was reached. The old plead-
ings used in the modern way failed to state the real issue and often
concealed the facts. It may well be better to reach an issue
upon a statement of the facts on both sides and to let the Court
apply the law to the facts so stated, but whether the facts con-
stitute a cause of action or a defense will no longer appear upon
the face of the pleadings drawn in accordance with the estab-
lished forms.
Edward Q. Keasbey.
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